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Nomenclature
Investment cost of generator k ($) J n;j ; K n;k
Incidence matrix for generators I n;i
Incidence matrix for demands S n;l ; S n;m Matrix of sending nodes of lines R n;l ; R n;m Matrix of receiving nodes of lines
Reactance of line l(m) (p.u.) G j Maximum production of generator j (MW)
Maximum consumption of demand i (MW) Production of unit j in period t (MW) b g k;t
Production of unit k in period t (MW) f l;t ( b f m;t ) Flow of line l(m) in period t (MW) n;t
Voltage angle at node n in period t (p.u.) b G k;t Investment for unit k in period t (MW) Investment option for line m at period t
Introduction
Optimal expansion of the transmission network is a major concern in electricity markets around the world. While generation and retail sectors have ‡our-ished under the forces of competition, the transmission sector has experienced a shortfall in necessary investment mainly because of lack of incentive mechanisms [1] . This has increased congestion in the transmission network [2] . The large-scale integration of renewable energy sources requires signi…cant transmission expansion planning. Lack of investment incentives in the transmission sector exacerbates the situation and further increases transmission congestion costs [3] . Transmission congestion may increase market power in certain areas [4] , and create entry barriers for new competitive generators. Accordingly, a well-functioning transmission network is a critical part of the wholesale and retail markets for electricity. The incentive problem for transmission expansion planning has been addressed in the relevant literature. Physical characteristics of electricity (such as loop ‡ows), economies of scale, and dynamics between the forward transmission market and other markets are mentioned as complicating factors in analysis of incentives for transmission expansion planning [5] , [6] . To tackle the incentive problem, the incremental surplus subsidy scheme (ISS) is proposed in [7] . References [8] and [9] propose price-cap mechanisms for incentivizing transmission expansion planning by a transmission company (Transco). Under certain conditions, these mechanisms lead to a transmission expansion plan which maximizes social welfare [10] . Reference [11] proposes a reward/penalty mechanism. In this mechanism, the regulator rewards the Transco when the transmission network is expanded and the congestion rents are decreased. Reference [12] proposes an out-turn mechanism. The out-turn is de…ned as the di¤erence between actual electricity prices and prices without transmission congestion. The Transco is responsible for total out-turn cost and any transmission losses. The merchant mechanism proposed in [13] aims to bring competition into transmission expansion planning using the concept of …-nancial transmission rights (FTR) [14] . References [10] and [15] extend the work in [8] and propose the HRV mechanism for transmission expansion planning. In the HRV mechanism, Transco maximizes its pro…t (sum of merchandising surplus and a …xed charge) subject to the price-cap constraint introduced in [8] .
The HRV mechanism has been tested on simpli…ed models of Northwestern Europe and the Northeast U.S. [10] , [16] . Mathematically, the HRV model is a non-linear program with equilibrium constraints (NLPEC) and local optimizers have been used to solve the related model but with no guarantee of global optimality. Nevertheless, …nding an optimal incentive mechanism for transmission expansion planning is an open question both in thory and in practice. The current paper contributes to the literature by proposing an alternative incentive mechanism for transmission expansion planning following the mechanisms in [8] and [10] . The revenue of the Transco consists of its network merchandising surplus and a …xed charge to consumers. The Transco maximizes its pro…t by expanding its transmission network. The pro…t-maximizing Transco is subject to a proposed revenue-cap constraint which is set by the regulator. The Transco also anticipates and in ‡uences optimal generation dispatch and investment (we disregard strategic behavior in the generation sector). The proposed revenue-cap regulatory constraint is linearized while the price-cap regulatory constraint in [8] has bilinear terms and cannot be linearized. Subsequently, the whole mechanism is reformulated as a mixed-integer, quadratically-constrained program (MIQCP) which can be solved to global optimality (contrary to the NLPEC of HRV model with no guarantee of global optimality). In all previous incentive models the discrete nature of transmission expansion 1 and potential substitution between generation expansion and transmission expansion are ignored. In our proposed model, the transmission expansion is a discrete decision and the generation investment decisions are decided endogenously by the anticipatory, pro…t-maximizing Transco. We have also tested our proposed incentive mechanism when transmission expansion planning is driven by demand growth and when the generation expansion planning decisions are exogenous to the model (reactive Transco). The numerical results in this paper show that in all studied cases, the proposed mechanism incentivizes the Transco to expand the transmission network in a welfare-maximizing way. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the benchmark model for the proposed incentive mechanism. The proposed approach for transmission expansion planning is detailed in Section 4. To show the operation of the incentive mechanism an illustrative example is used in Section 5. The modi…ed Garver and IEEE 24-node system are studied in Section 6. Two cases of transmission expansion f l;t 100 X l ( X n S n;l n;t X n R n;l n;t ) = 0 ( l;t ) 8l; t (1e)
The optimization problem (1) is a dynamic, mixed-integer, quadratic program (MIQP) over planning periods (t). We assume a quadratic utility function for demand, linear generation operation and investment costs, and linear transmission investment costs in the objective function (1a). The objective function is to maximize the sum of social welfare over di¤erent planning periods. is the discount factor which makes the short-term social welfare and long-term investment costs comparable. By constraints (1b) and (1c), the …rst period is assumed to have no generation-transmission investment and investments are understood to be cumulative. Energy balance at each node is modeled in (1d). Constraints (1e) and (1f) calculate the power ‡ows through existing transmission lines and bound the calculated power ‡ows by thermal limits of the lines (base of 100 MVA is used to change the p.u. power ‡ow values to actual MW values). Constraints (1g), (1h), and (1i) model the investment in new transmission lines and bound their power ‡ows by thermal capacities of these new lines. The 1 is a suitably large constant. The maximum generation capacities of existing and new generators are modeled in constraints (1j) and (1k). The maximum consumption for each demand point in each planning period is modeled in (1l). Constraint (1m) sets node 1 as the reference node.
is the set of decision variables considered. As it is commonly assumed in the engineering literature ( [18] , [19] ) a single load scenario corresponding to forecasted peak load in each planning period (D i;t ) is considered. The results of the optimization problem (1) are used as the benchmark for measuring the economic e¢ ciency of our proposed transmission expansion planning approach.
The pro…t-maximizing transmission expansion planning
We assume an independent regional transmission company (Transco) who owns the transmission network. The Transco does the transmission expansion planning, bears the costs, and collects the revenues. The Transco revenue consists of its network merchandising surplus (total payo¤ from demand minus total payment to generators) and a …xed charge ( t ) per planning period t. The …xed charge is a charge to consumers to fund the transmission expansion costs. This pro…t-maximizing Transco can be modeled via a bilevel program shown in (2).
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The Transco maximizes its pro…t over planning periods (t) subject to a regulatory constraint on its …xed-charge component ( t ) of its revenue. The regulatory constraint sets an upper bound on the …xed charge. The upper bound is the sum of the …xed charge in the previous planning period and change in consumer surplus between current planning period and the previous one. Under the proposed structure, the pro…t-maximizing Transco is willing to cede some merchandising surpluses in exchnage of an increase in the …xed charge. Mathematically, this revenue-cap regulatory constraint can be written as (2c) where R and Y are in ‡ation and e¢ ciency factors set by the regulator (in this paper they are set to 0 for sake of mathematical brevity), respectively. The Transco anticipates and in ‡uences the generation dispatch and investment resulting from its transmission planning decisions. In an environment of price-taking generators and loads, the optimal generation dispatch and investment can be modeled as optimization problem (2d)-(2e). This optimization problem is a convex quadratic program (QP) in minimization where the transmission planning decisions are exogenously set by the Transco. Accordingly, the interaction between the pro…t-maximizing Transco with revenue-cap regulation and optimal generation dispatch and investment can be modeled as the bilevel program (2) . The upper level is the pro…t-maximizing Transco (2a)-(2b)-(2c) and the lower level is a convex QP (in minimization) for the generation dispatch and investment decisions (2d)-(2e). Since the lower level is a convex QP (in minimization), the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [20] are both necessary and su¢ cient. Hence, the lower-level optimization can be replaced by its KKT conditions. 2 Following [22] and [23] , the complementary slackness conditions are replaced by the strong duality condition. This leads to less number of constraints and binary variables in the …nal model. The stationary conditions for the lower-level QP (2d)-(2e) are derived in (3).
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From (1e) and the complementary conditions for constraints (1f), (1g), (1h), and (1i), we have
If z m;t = 1, then term T 1 is zero. If z m;t = 0, then both constraints (1g) and (1h) are slack which means m;t = m;t = 0 and accordingly T 1 = 0.
Hence, T 1 is always zero. From (1m) and (3i), it is obvious that T 2 is zero. By introducing b m;t = z m;t ( m;t + m;t ) and b m;t ( m;t + m;t )
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Where p = s [{A i;t ; A2 i;t ; d2 i;t ; n;t ; ! i;t ; ! i;t ; j;t ; j;t ; k;t ; k;t ; k;t ; 0 k ; l;t ; l;t ; l;t ; m;t ; m;t ; l;t ; l;t ; 0 t } is the set of decision variables of the optimization problem (7) . The values 1 and 2 are suitably large constants. These constants must be selected carefully such that they do not impose extra bounds on variables (if they are selected too small) or result in ill-conditioning in the optimization problem (7) (if they are selected very large). The optimization program (7) is a MIQCP and can be solved using commercial solvers. The proposed approach for transmission expansion planning has the following sequence of actions:
1. The regulator sets the parameters R and Y in the regulatory constraint (2c). It also estimates the parameters i , i of linear demand functions using historic market prices [25] , [7] .
2. The Transco maximizes its pro…t over the planning periods taking regulatory constraint into account.
3. The Transco auctions o¤ its (existing and expanded) transmission capacity as the point-to-point FTRs to market participants.
4. The Transco collects the merchandising surplus using the FTR auction in step 3 and sets the …xed charges according to the regulatory constraint.
5. The market operator distributes the merchandising surplus between FTR holders.
For sake of comparison, two existing approaches for regulating a Transco are also modeled.
Transco without regulation:
In this case, the Transco is unregulated in terms of transmission expansion planning decisions. This case can be modeled by removing the revenue-cap regulatory constraint (7b) from optimization problem (7) and setting t = 0. In the no-regulation case, the cost of transmission expansion planning has to be fully recovered by congestion rents. Accordingly, the Transco will only expand such lines that increase congestion rent.
Transco with cost-plus regulation:
In this case, the Transco receives not only the merchandising surplus but it can charge an extra …xed fee based on its cost of transmission expansion planning. This case can be modeled by replacing the regulatory constraint (7b) by t = t 1 + (1 + r) P m C m (z m;t z m;t 1 ) where r 2 R + is set by the regulator.
Illustrative example
The proposed mechanism for transmission expansion planning is applied to an illustrative two-node system. The single-line diagram and data of this example system is shown in Fig. 1 . Four planning periods (t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3, t 4 ) are considered and peak demand at each planning period is increased by 10% as compared to the previous period peak demand. Peak demand at …rst period (t 1 ) is 200 MW. Each planning year is represented by 500 identical hours ( = 500). As it is shown in Fig. 2 , the Transco with revenue-cap regulation is incentivized to produce the results of the welfare-maximizing benchmark. The Transco without regulation invests in L3 and generators G2 and G3 react by expanding their generation capacities to 100 MW and 12.22 MW, respectively. The Transco with cost-plus regulation invests in L2 and this results in 100 MW and 12.22 MW generation capacities for G2 and G3, respectively. In both the no-regulation, and cost-plus regulation cases, existing and new lines are still congested and the served demand (212.22 MW) is less than the served demand in the revenue-cap regulation case (225 MW). The Transco with cost-plus regulation selects the expensive candidate line (L2) for investment as compared to L3 selected in the no-regulation case. This is because the cost-plus regulated Transco is rewarded a portion of its investment cost. The expansion results over regulatory periods (t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3, t 4 ) are set out in Table 1 for benchmark and revenue-cap cases, and in Table 2 for cost-plus and no-regulation cases. For the rest of the tables in this paper, BI, N-REG, CP-REG, and RC-REG stand for benchmark investment, no-regulation, cost-plus regulation, and revenue-cap regulation. Also, G-Plan, T-Plan, FC, TIC, GIC, TP, and SW stand for gen- eration expansion plan, transmission expansion plan, …xed charge, transmission investment cost, generation investment cost, Transco pro…t, and social welfare, respectively. As we can see, the prices at nodes 1 and 2 converge to 7,505 $/MW in revenue-cap regulation while in the no-regulation or cost-plus regulation, there is a price di¤erence of 4708 $/MW (11333 6625) between nodes 1 and 2. The social welfare at period 4 for revenue-cap regulation is $8,780,437 which is $242,234 (8780437 8538203) higher than the social welfares for noregulation and cost-plus regulation.
Numerical results
To further investigate the proposed model, the Garver's 6-node and IEEE 24-node systems are studied. The mathematical models are coded in GAMS and solved using CPLEX 12.6 solver. The simulations are run on a computer with a 2.7 GHz processor and 16 GB of RAM.
Modi…ed Garver' s 6-node example system
This system has 6 nodes, and 7 existing transmission lines. In the modi…ed system, line between nodes 4 and 6 is added to the existing transmission lines. The pro…t-maximizing Transco has 10 candidate transmission lines located between nodes (2,3), (2,4), (2, 5) , (2, 6) , (3, 4) , (3, 5) , (3, 6) , (4, 5) , (4, 6) , and (5,6) where pair (x,y) means line from node x to node y. There are two candidate generators at nodes 2 and 4. The marginal costs for these generators are 0.01 and 0.02 $/MWh with the investment cost of 20,000 and 4000 $/MWy. The is taken as 50. The rest of system data is the same as the one reported in [26] . Di¤erent regulatory regimes lead to di¤erent transmission expansion planning strategies. This in turn results in di¤erent investment reactions by generators. These investment strategies are reported in Table 3 . As in Table 3 , the Transco with revenue-cap regulation while maximizing its own pro…t achieves the closest system social welfare (10.10564 M$) to the benchmark social welfare (10.146 M$). For this system, the Transco with no-regulation is the second best (with social welfare of 9.857981 M$), and the Transco with cost-plus regulation is the third best (with social welfare of 9.648374 M$). The nodal prices in period t 4 are shown in Table 4 . As this table shows the average of nodal prices ( Table 5 : Candidate transmission lines for modi…ed IEEE 24-node system, Cct: 
Modi…ed IEEE 24-node example system
The initial network topology is the one reported in [27] and 10 candidate transmission lines as speci…ed in Table 5 are considered. The generation system is modi…ed as reported in Table 6 and 7. The rest of data is the one reported in [19] . The is set at 5000. The total load is 2850 MW, which corresponds to the Tuesday of week 51 from 5 to 6 pm. The Transco plans under di¤erent regulatory regimes and the various generation investment choices are reported in Table 8 .
The results for the pro…t-maximizing Transco with revenue-cap regulation are the same as the benchmark results. The case without regulation is the second best and the case with the cost-plus regulation is in the third place in terms of social welfare. The Transco with cost-plus regulation has the highest cost of transmission expansion planning and the one without regulation has the lowest transmission expansion cost. These results are expected. In the case of costplus regulation, the Transco is rewarded based on its transmission investment cost, and in the no-regulation case, the Transco invests in lines which increases congestion rent and it does not relieve congestion from system. The pro…le of As it is clear from Fig. 3 , the Transco with revenue-cap regulation achieves the lowest electricity prices. The average of nodal prices for revenue-cap regulation is 201 k$/MW while for cost-plus regulation and no-regulation, it is 240 k$/MW. This is equivalent to a 20% increase in average prices.
Further Discussions
The proposed approach for transmission expansion planning is analyzed under two other realistic situations. First, it is assumed that the generation system is static and transmission expansion planning is only driven by demand growth. Second, we take the view of a reactive Transco where the generation investments are exogenous parameters.
Case 1: Transmission expansion planning driven by demand growth
For this study, only existing generators of the modi…ed Garver's system are considered. The rest of the system data are those speci…ed in Section 6. The results of transmission expansion planning under di¤erent regulatory regimes are reported in Table 9 . The Transco without regulation does not invest in any new transmission lines. This is because investing in any transmission line reduces the overall system congestion rent. The pro…t of the Transco is 3.1379 M$ and the social welfare is 8.980316 M$. The Transco with cost-plus regulation invests in …ve new lines as reported in Table 9 with investment cost of 237 M$. The Transco pro…t with cost-plus regulation is higher than one for the case with no-regulation but at the cost of decreased social welfare. However, the revenue-cap regulation approach results in the benchmark solution. In terms of nodal prices, the average price for Transco with revenue-cap regulation is the cheapest as compared to ones for no-regulation and cost-plus regulation cases (1435 $/MW as compared to 2925 $/MW and 2755 $/MW). Table 10 reports the results for the modi…ed IEEE 24-node system. The proposed Transco invests 30.98 M$ in transmission system expansion and collects a pro…t of 1389.3 M$ which includes a total …xed charge of 148.15 M$. The social welfare is 4016.828 M$ which is the benchmark social welfare. Average price in this case is 243 $/MW. In cases of no-regulation and cost-plus regulation, the Transco invests 38.27 M$ and 127.27 M$ in transmission system which are higher than the benchmark cost. Accordingly the social welfare in these cases are less than the benchmark social welfare.
Case 2: Reactive Transco with exogenous generation investments
In this case, the capacity of existing generators for the modi…ed Garver's system and modi…ed IEEE 24-node system are increased by 15% in each planning year. The results are reported in Tables 11 and 12 . For this case, the proposed model has the closest social welfare to the benchmark welfare. In terms of average nodal prices for period t 4 , both revenue-cap and cost-plus regulation prices (208 k$/MW) are closest to the benchmark price (192 k$/MW).
Conclusions
This paper proposes a pro…t-maximizing approach for transmission expansion planning. The Transco expands the transmission network over planning periods, collects merchandising surplus, and charges …xed fees to consumers. This is subject to a proposed revenue-cap constraint set by the regulator. The proposed approach is a bilevel program with a pro…t-maximizing Transco at the upper level and optimal generation dispatch and investment at the lower level. The whole proposed mechanism is reformulated as a mixed-integer, quadraticallyconstrained program (MIQCP) which can be solved to global optimality. Also, the model considers the discrete nature of transmission planning decisions and potential substitution between transmission expansion and generation expansion. The mechanism has been applied and tested on a modi…ed Garvers'system as well as a modi…ed IEEE 24-node system. In all tests, the proposed mecha-nism incentivizes Transco to produce welfare-maximum outcomes. We further have tested the proposed mechanism under cases where transmission expansion planning is driven by demand growth and reactive Tranco. The welafremaximum outcomes are also achieved under these two cases. The results imply that the proposed mechanism can tackle the incentive problem for investment in transmission sector. Application of the stochastic programming models to the proposed approach in the paper is a good extension of this work.
